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Abstract
The tax-systems perspective considers a variety of costs and behavioral margins often ignored
in standard tax analysis: administrative and compliance costs, evasion and avoidance behav-
ior, and multiple non-rate tax-system instruments (e.g., withholding and public disclosure).
We show how the standard optimal tax framework can be augmented to include these new
sources of cost and behavioral response by considering some enduring tax policy questions:
What is the optimal commodity tax base breadth? How does enforcement e!ort targeted to
avoidance behavior a!ect optimal progressivity? What fraction of returns should be audited?
Should small firms be excluded from a tax system?
!This article is an edited extract from the forthcoming book Tax Systems by Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer,
published by The MIT Press in 2014. Joel Slemrod delivered the Richard Musgrave Lecture 2013, in Munich on
April 11, based on this material.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
1.1 What is a Tax System
A tax system1 is a set of rules, regulations, and procedures that 1) defines what events or states
of the world trigger tax liability (tax bases and rates), 2) specifies who or what entity must remit
that tax and when (remittance rules), and 3) details procedures for ensuring compliance, including
information-reporting requirements and the consequences (including penalties) of not remitting
the legal liability in a timely fashion (enforcement rules).
Much of modern economic analysis of taxation, and certainly the seminal contributions, presumes
that tax liability can be ascertained and collected costlessly, in which case 2) is irrelevant and 3)
is unnecessary. But this way of modeling taxation misses much that is important about taxes. It
cannot address many current tax policy issues—should Greece raise revenue to meet its bailout
conditions by raising tax rates, or by cracking down on tax evasion?—providing one reason why
there is often a disconnect between topical tax issues of the day and the economic theory of
taxation. And, in our view, it misses much of what is intellectually fascinating about taxes.
This paper is motivated by the aspects of reality that the standard model ignores. Some of these
blind spots are:
1. Although some individuals may remit their tax liability dutifully, others view compliance as
a tactical decision and will evade their liabilities if the odds of success seem favorable.
2. Taxpayers will re-arrange their a!airs to legally reduce their tax liability, including e!orts
to reduce their tax liability without altering their real activities, which we will refer to as
avoidance.
3. Limiting avoidance and evasion is costly, and tax authorities have limited administrative
resources.
1This name is inspired by the title of Richard Musgrave’s 1969 book Fiscal Systems, which addresses how fiscal
institutions and functions change with their environment, and what similarities remain even though the setting
di!ers.
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4. Tax authorities have limited policy instruments.
5. Taxpayers (and tax policy makers) have cognitive limitations.
6. The world is complex, complicating the collection of non-capricious taxes. Some of the
complication is manufactured by taxpayers to obfuscate their a!airs, and some exists because
the tax system is used to achieve specific social goals in addition to raising revenue.
These issues are especially critical in developing countries, so much so that a former IMF o"cial2
once opined that, in developing countries, “Tax administration is tax policy.” But they are also
critical in developed countries, where the operative issue is generally not the feasibility of certain
taxes, but rather the comparison of alternative imperfect tax structures. For example, while in
many developing countries an income tax that relies on self-reporting cannot be administered with
tolerable cost and equity, in a developed country the question is to what extent tax design should
reflect the reality of evasion, the necessity of enforcement, and the costs of collection. In addition,
an important set of generic aspects of income tax structure, such as the absence of taxation
of imputed rents from consumer durables, taxation of capital gains (if at all) on a realization
basis, and pre-set depreciation schedules, are undoubtedly largely driven by practical concerns
of administrability. For these reasons, consideration of evasion, avoidance, and administration is
essential to the positive and normative analysis of taxation in all jurisdictions.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the properties of admin-
istrative and compliance cost, and their consequences for tax system design. In Section 3 we
analyze taxpayer e!orts to reduce tax liability, by both legal means (avoidance) and illegal means
(evasion). Several new tax-system instruments that can help the tax authorities limit evasion and
avoidance behavior are introduced in Section 4: withholding and information reporting, market
transactions, and public disclosure. Section 5 explains the assumptions under which the elasticity
of taxable income (ETI) serves as a su"cient statistic for the marginal welfare cost of all behav-
ioral response to taxes, discusses issues in empirically estimating its magnitude, and summarizes
findings in the empirical ETI literature. We switch gears in Section 6 from positive to normative
2Casanegra de Jantscher (1990, p. 179).
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analysis, studying three central questions in tax-system design: i) the optimal commodity tax base
breadth, ii) the optimal level of audit enforcement (hint: don’t equate marginal audit revenue with
the marginal administrative cost of audits), and iii) the optimal degree of tax-system progressivity
when the behavioral response to taxes can be controlled, at some resource cost, by varying tax
base breadth. Section 7 discusses the role of firms in real-world tax systems; firms serve a vital role
as remitting, information reporting, and withholding agents, but monitoring their activity creates
administrative cost, and it can be optimal to exclude small firms—either implicitly or explicitly—
from the tax system. Section 8 addresses lines and notches, discontinuities in characteristic space
and budget sets, their consequences for tax system design, such as the optimal degree of di!eren-
tiation in commodity tax rates, and their use in empirical work as a source of identification for
behavioral elasticities. Some concluding thoughts are o!ered in Section 9.
2 Multiple Sources of Cost
2.1 Administrative Cost
Even if all taxpayers were scrupulously honest, any tax system requires an administrative system
with a bureaucracy to calculate tax liabilities and to record and check remittance. But, not all
taxpayers are honest, nor are taxpayers obliged to arrange their a!airs in a way that suits the
tax authority. As a result, some taxpayers go to considerable lengths to reduce the size of their
tax bill. In response to avoidance and evasion, all tax authorities judge it worthwhile to expend
resources to limit revenue loss as well as any undesirable e"ciency, horizontal or vertical equity
consequences. Moreover, it will always be relatively cheap to collect taxes in a capricious way—
without measurement or verification—so capriciousness must be balanced by the value of horizontal
equity or legitimacy.
For any given objective, there are more and less e!ective ways for a tax administration to operate.
For example, what is the optimal use of computers and information technology? Should a tax
administration be organized by tax levy (e.g., corporate tax versus value-added tax), or by tax-
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payer segment (e.g., corporations versus high-income individuals)? How should it be organized to
minimize corruption? These questions have been addressed extensively but informally, especially
in a developing-country context in, e.g., Bird (1983), and are certainly context-specific.3
The administrative cost of obtaining information is a function of the physical size, tangibil-
ity/visibility and the mobility of the tax base (e.g., it is harder to tax diamonds than windows),
whether there is a registration of the tax base (e.g., owners of cars, holders of drivers’ licenses), the
number of taxpayer units, and the extent of information sharing with other agencies, both non-tax
agencies within a jurisdiction and tax authorities in other jurisdictions. Administrative cost is also
an increasing function of the complexity and lack of clarity of the tax law, ceteris paribus.
Administrative costs possess two additional properties that complicate the formal modeling of tax
system issues: they tend to be discontinuous and to have decreasing average costs with respect
to the tax rate. To see the first property, consider two commodity tax rates, denoted by t1 and
t2. If t1 = t2, then only the total sales of the two commodities need be reported and monitored.
If, however, the two rates di!er even slightly, then the sales of the two commodities must be
reported separately, approximately doubling the required flow of information. This undoubtedly
explains why, in contrast to optimal commodity tax theory that suggests di!erent tax rates on
each commodity, real tax systems feature a very small number of tax rates. Second, there are
decreasing average costs because the cost of inspecting a tax base does not depend on the tax
rate (except to the extent that people may be more inclined to cheat with a higher tax rate).
Hence, a higher tax rate reduces the administrative cost per dollar of revenue collected (Sandford,
1973). Administrative cost may also be a function of the combination of the taxes employed and
their rates, because the collection of information concerning one tax may facilitate the collection
of another tax (e.g., inspection of VAT receipts may facilitate the collection of income tax). Note,
finally, that in cases of negative marginal and average tax rates, such as arise under the earned
income tax credit, the administrative problem is of a di!erent nature, as the evading taxpayer’s
incentive is to overstate, rather than understate, income.
Administrative costs have implications for the optimal boundary between firms. Coase (1937)
3A good description of the properties of administrative cost can be found in Shoup et al. (1937, pp. 337-351).
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argued that (in the absence of externalities) the equilibrium boundary is optimal because firms
consider all relevant costs and benefits of expanding their size. But Dharmapala et al. (2011) show
that administrative costs are akin to an externality, because firm size, and industrial organization
more generally, will a!ect the cost of administering a tax system at a given e!ectiveness, in part
because they a!ect the availability of more easily observable arms-length transactions. They show
that when administrative costs are fixed per firm, if a firm is taxed then it should face a fixed
fee—akin to a Pigouvian tax—equal to the administrative cost of taxing it.
2.2 Compliance Cost
Compliance costs, in contrast to administrative costs, are incurred in the tax remittance and
collection process directly by taxpayers and by third parties (such as employers who are required
to remit tax on behalf of their employees and provide information to the tax authority). We say
“directly” for two reasons: 1) the burden of the compliance costs may be shifted away from the
party that expends the resources to comply, just as an explicit tax may be shifted, due to changes
in relative prices, and 2) administrative costs also ultimately burden taxpayers, but show up in
the first instance as government expenditures, not as monetary or time costs to taxpayers, even
though ultimately citizens/taxpayers bear these costs.
Measuring the extent and nature of compliance costs is not, as in the case of administrative costs,
as straightforward as culling the relevant data from government budgets. Surveys are the most
commonly used method to measure compliance costs, although low response rates can impair the
reliability of their findings. While re-weighting survey results based on observable demographics is
often helpful, unobserved heterogeneity between respondents and non-respondents is likely to be
important. The direction of nonrandom underreporting bias is generally unclear, so survey results
may not even accurately bound compliance costs. While respondents may see compliance as a
“vexatious cost” (Tait, 1988, p. 352) and overstate their costs in an attempt to influence policy, it
is also possible that those who find responding to surveys most burdensome also find tax-system
compliance particularly costly (Sandford, 1995).
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Regardless of these methodological di"culties, one fact stands out among all studies of all taxes in
all countries: compliance costs dwarf administrative costs. For example, Slemrod (1996) estimates
that, for the U.S. income tax, the private compliance cost is about 10 cents per dollar of revenue
collected, compared to an administrative cost of about 0.6 cents per dollar collected for all the taxes
the IRS administers. The value of time spent greatly exceeds taxpayers’ out-of-pocket expenditures
in complying with the U.S. income tax system. Based on a survey of Minnesota taxpayers for the
1982 tax year, Slemrod and Sorum (1984) estimate that a majority of time spent by taxpayers
complying with the income tax system is due to record keeping, followed by return preparation,
research, and interacting with a tax advisor.
Some of what is correctly measured as compliance cost is an unavoidable cost of complying with
the law, and some of it is voluntarily undertaken in an e!ort to reduce tax liability. In either case
it approximately represents resource costs to society because otherwise-productive resources are
diverted to compliance activity. That taxpayers will voluntarily spend time on compliance in an
e!ort to reduce their tax liability does not make it any less of a social cost; e"ciency cost arises
because taxpayers are encouraged by the tax system to engage in avoidance activity they would
not engage in were it not for taxes.
To some extent administrative costs and compliance costs are substitutes, in the sense that either
the government or the taxpayer may have the lead role in collecting key information. As an
example, consider when is it optimal to delegate to employers the authority to remit taxes on
behalf of, and convey information about, employees, thus allowing the administration to audit
both the taxpayer agent and the taxpayer himself, and when it is optimal to deal only with
the employee. Clearly, given that the employer already has the necessary information, it would
save administrative costs to require him to pass it along to the tax administrator. This might also
reduce total social costs if the cost of gathering information by the administration is higher than the
increase in cost caused by imposing a two-stage gathering system. Note that a withholding system
requires two information gathering systems and might generate incentives for the withholding agent
to evade the taxes it collects, or to collaborate with withholdees in withholding less than required
(Yaniv 1988, 1992).
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However, the potential e"ciency of involving taxpayers in the administrative process must be
tempered with a practical consideration. Administrative costs must pass through a budgeting
process, while compliance costs are hidden. Hence, there may be a tendency to view a policy that
reduces administrative cost at the expense of an equal (or greater) increase in compliance costs as
a decrease in social cost, because it results in a decrease in government expenditures. In addition,
administrative costs should be weighted higher than compliance costs because they are funded by
tax revenue raised through distortionary taxes, for which the marginal cost of funds exceeds unity.
3 Evasion and Avoidance
3.1 Evasion
In the presence of tax evasion we need to enrich both the positive model of taxpayer decision-
making and the normative model of optimal government behavior. The natural starting point
for the former is to consider the costs and benefits of tax evasion. And, indeed, the standard
framework for considering an individual’s choice of whether and how much to evade taxes is a
deterrence model. This was first formulated in the context of a flat income tax by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972), who adapted Becker’s (1968) model of criminal behavior to the economics of tax
evasion. In this model, which we will refer to as the A-S model, a risk-averse taxpayer decides
whether and how much to evade taxes in the same way she would approach any risky decision or
gamble—by maximizing expected utility.
In the basic A-S model, labor income, wl, is held fixed; the risk-averse taxpayer chooses only what




(1" p) u (wl (1" t) + te) + pu (wl (1" t)" !e) , (1)
where von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, u, is concave, p is the probability that evasion is detected
and triggers a penalty of ! times the taxable income understatement, wl (1" t) is the taxpayer’s
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true after-tax income, and t is the tax rate. Each dollar of taxable income understatement o!ers a
payo! of t with probability (1" p), along with a penalty of ! with probability p. If and only if the
expected payo! to this gamble, (1"p)t"p!, is positive, a risk-averse taxpayer will engage in some
evasion, with the amount depending on the expected payo! and the taxpayer’s risk preferences;
more risk-averse individuals will, ceteris paribus, evade less. Increases in either p or ! decrease
evasion. As pointed out first by Yitzhaki (1974), in many tax systems the penalty depends on
the tax understatement, rather than the income understatement as stated in Equation (1). Under
the Yitzhaki formulation, increasing t has a negative income e!ect, but no substitution e!ect,
making, ceteris paribus, a reduction in evasion optimal if risk-aversion is decreasing in income. To
most, this is a profoundly unintuitive notion, one that has undoubtedly inspired further theoretical
development and empirical analysis.
Some social scientists have argued that the A-S deterrence framework misses important elements
of the tax evasion decision, and question some of its central assumptions, including that (i) nothing
per se about its illegality matters and (ii) everyone acts as a free rider, so that there is no issue of
intrinsic willingness to pay, or “tax morale.” Some have gone further to suggest that, in thinking
about tax evasion, it is necessary to abandon the standard expected utility maximization model
and incorporate “behavioral” considerations. Much of the evidence related to these non-standard
behaviors comes from how people react to other people, as in lab experiments. But the psycho-
logical attitudes of individuals toward government might be fundamentally di!erent than their
attitudes toward other people, or even other organizations. Individuals might feel more dutiful
and even obedient toward government.
Neither type of theory provides clear quantitative predictions about the determinants of evasion,
and so a large empirical literature has appeared, albeit one with many challenges. The threat
of punishment and social shame make taxpayers unwilling to respond accurately to surveys, and
results from randomized audits are typically unavailable to researchers, so a range of indirect
methodologies have been pursued in the literature. What Slemrod and Weber (2012) dub the
“traces-of-income” approach makes progress by looking for a variable correlated with true income,
allowing the researcher to predict true income and back out the extent of evasion by comparing
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the prediction to taxpayers’ reports. Pissarides and Weber (1989), who pioneered this approach,
used U.K. Family Expenditure Survey data on food consumption to estimate the extent of evasion.
Assuming that only the self-employed evade, and that the relationship between food consumption
and true income is independent of employment status, they are able to predict true income—and
therefore underreporting—for the self-employed survey respondents. Assuming income reports in
the survey match those given to the tax authority, they estimate that self-employed people in the
United Kingdom on average underreported their income by about one-third. Feldman and Slemrod
(2007) follow a similar approach, but avoid the need to use survey data by instead using charitable
giving as reported on income tax returns relative to reported income as the trace of evasion. They
find that, other things equal, reported positive self-employment income of $1 is associated with
the same level of contributions as $1.54 of wage and salary income, which implies—assuming a
negligible wage and salary noncompliance rate and that the self-employed are not inherently more
charitable than others—a self-employment noncompliance rate of 35 percent; for positive farm net
income, the implied noncompliance rate is 74 percent. Intriguingly, negative reported values for
self-employment income are also associated with more contributions than reported by taxpayers
with no self-employment income, suggesting that on average these reported losses are associated
with higher true incomes.
In contrast to indirect means of inquiry, randomized field experiments can o!er compelling evidence
on the causal impact of particular policy interventions. In one of the first examples of applying
this method to tax evasion research, Slemrod et al. (2001) conducted an experiment in Minnesota,
sending a treatment group of taxpayers a letter warning them that their tax returns would be
“closely examined.” Kleven et al. (2011) have since conducted a similar, but more comprehensive,
study in Denmark. They conclude that threat-of-audit letters (and prior audits) have a significant
e!ect on self-reported (but not third-party-reported) income.
In a field experiment in Austria, Fellner et al. (In Press) use a randomized design to test the e!ect
on compliance with Austrian television and radio licensing fees of various mailings to potential
non-compliers. All mailings asked recipients to clarify within 14 days why no payment had been
received, with the letters di!ering in their emphasis of either the threat of detection and sanction,
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a moral appeal equating compliance with fairness, and a third variant providing social information
on the overall high level of compliance. Those receiving any type of mailing were significantly more
likely to make a payment within 50 days of receiving the letter, but only the variant emphasizing
the threat of punishment induced an additional increase in compliance. Fellner et al. interpret the
generic e!ect of the mailing as an “alert e!ect” signaling that non-payment had been noticed, with
the consequences of noncompliance amplified by the threat variant.
Field evidence on Chilean firms’ compliance with the VAT highlights the connection between
information reports received by the tax authority and levels of evasion. Because firms can only
claim tax credits for inputs bought from tax-compliant suppliers, the invoice-credit VAT system
has a built-in (albeit imperfect) self-enforcement mechanism. Firms purchasing inputs would like
to overstate purchase costs to inflate tax rebates, but sellers need to understate sales proceeds to
minimize VAT liability. Because these incentives conflict and—except for final sales to consumers—
information reports are made by both parties to each transaction to the tax authority, the VAT
system is believed to dramatically increase the probability of evasion being detected. Pomeranz
(2011) tests this hypothesis by mailing increased audit threat letters to over 100,000 randomly
selected Chilean firms, using a sample of over 300,000 firms receiving no letter as the control
group. Consistent with theoretical predictions on the self-enforcement mechanism, the increase in
VAT receipts (and therefore the level of inferred evasion) induced by the letters is concentrated
at the level of sales from firms to final consumers, for which there is no paper trail, suggesting
that for an individual firm, information reporting acts as a substitute for audit risk. In line with
the findings of Fellner et al. and Blumenthal et al. (2001) from the Minnesota randomized tax
experiment, Pomeranz (2011) found that a mailing appealing to tax morale but promising no
increased enforcement had little e!ect on VAT payments.
3.2 Avoidance
Economists generally di!erentiate between illegal means of reducing tax liability, referred to as
evasion, and legal means of reducing tax liability, referred to as avoidance. In some contexts
the law is unclear and neither the taxpayer nor the tax authority, or both, may not know for
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sure which is which. But, more importantly, this definition of avoidance does not correspond to
another common usage among economists, in which the term avoidance does not include “real”
behavioral responses to changing tax rates such as reduced labor supply, altering the time path of
consumption, or consuming less highly-taxed cigarettes, but rather to a di!erent class of behaviors.
If not all legal behavioral response to tax rates is avoidance, how can it be usefully defined and
distinguished from real behavioral response? A good starting point is the definition of avoidance
akin to the one o!ered in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002): taxpayer e!orts to reduce their tax liability
that do not alter their consumption basket other than due to income e!ects. This definition covers
a broad range of behaviors. It includes paying a tax professional to alert one to the tax deductibility
of activities already undertaken. It covers changing the legal form of a given behavior, such as
reorganizing a business from a C corporation to an S corporation, recharacterizing ordinary income
as capital gain, or renaming a consumer loan as a home equity loan. It covers tax arbitrage, where
economically equivalent, but di!erentially taxed, positions are held simultaneously long and short,
producing tax savings. Finally, it covers (slightly) retiming a transaction to alter the tax year it
falls under, or slightly re-engineering a vehicle to change its tax classification.
The distinction between real behavioral response and avoidance does not arise in, for example,
the standard model of optimal commodity taxation, where consumption, and only consumption,
triggers tax liability, so the model does not allow any other behavior that could reduce tax liability.
The same is true of the standard optimal income tax model, where individuals’ only decision is
how much labor to supply, which a!ects tax liability by changing taxable income.
However, in many cases what triggers tax liability in actual tax systems is di!erent than what
triggers tax liability in stylized models. Retail purchases rather than consumption trigger retail
sales tax liability, receipt of labor income rather than the exertion of physical or mental labor
itself generally determines the timing of tax liability. Sales of appreciated capital assets trigger
tax liability rather than accrual of gain or consumption itself. Operational definitions of taxable
income di!er on many dimensions from the Haig-Simons definition of income: consumption plus
the change in net worth. As an example, in the U.S. taxable income does not include employer
contributions to employee health insurance, whereas Haig-Simons income would. These give rise
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to avoidance.
3.3 The Relationship Among Evasion, Avoidance, and Real Activity
The relationship between real activity on the one hand and evasion and/or avoidance is of note.
To illustrate this relationship, consider the example studied in Grubert and Slemrod (1998), who
provide empirical evidence of such an interaction for corporate income shifting to Puerto Rico. The
fact that corporate income earned by U.S. firms in Puerto Rico was essentially exempt from U.S.
corporate income taxation provided strong incentives for U.S. corporations to use transfer pricing
and other means of income shifting to declare as large a share as possible of their taxable corporate
income in Puerto Rico. Grubert and Slemrod’s key empirical finding is that the e!ective marginal
cost of income shifting is declining in the amount of real activity conducted in Puerto Rico: more
real activity makes it easier for the firm to claim legitimate income shifting. Importantly, avoidance
technology di!ers across firms and, as expected, Grubert and Slemrod (1998) found more evidence
of tax-motivated production in Puerto Rico among firms for which arms-length transfer prices
are di"cult to determine, such as manufacturers with intangible brand value or pharmaceutical
companies with high R&D expenditure. This provides an implicit subsidy to real investment in
Puerto Rico, what Slemrod (2001) calls “avoidance facilitation.”
The notion of avoidance facilitation allows us to reinterpret the fascinating study of Rosen (1976)
which, in a regression analysis of female labor supply, splits apart as explanatory variables the
pre-tax wage rate, w, and the net-of-tax (1" t) terms, interpreting any di!erence in estimated
coe"cients (which Rosen (1976) did not ultimately find) as evidence of “tax illusion”—lack of
salience in more modern language. But we can now say that, in the presence of avoidance and
evasion, no appeal to tax illusion is needed to explain a di!erential e!ect of the w and (1" t)
terms, because the e!ective relative price of the real decision depends on the avoidance or evasion
technology—the tax can be “finessed,” but the pre-tax wage rate cannot be. In general, one should
not expect a homologous response to a pre-tax price and a net-of-tax term.
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4 Multiple Tax Instruments
4.1 Withholding and Information Reporting
Withholding refers to a situation where some or all of a tax liability must be remitted by someone
other than the statutory bearer of the liability. It facilitates administration by allowing the tax
authority to take advantage of economies of scale that exist in dealing with a smaller number of
larger remitters who have relatively sophisticated record-keeping and accounting systems. It also
acts as a revenue safeguard, ensuring that some tax is remitted even when the statutory bearer
fails to file a return or otherwise disregards the tax obligations.
Withholding remittance responsibility is usually restricted to businesses and government agencies.
Individuals in their capacity as employees and consumers are usually excluded—they are too
numerous and not su"ciently capable in general to be suitable withholding agents. In order to
be able to withhold an appropriate amount of tax, the withholding agent must have an ongoing
relationship with the statutory bearer of the tax or, alternatively, the withholding scheme must be
su"ciently simple to avoid the need for such a relationship.
Withholding is about which individuals or entities remit a given tax liability, not about what
triggers tax liability. The tax remittance (or, alternatively, tax collection) structure is, however,
a more general concept than what is called withholding. For example, a retail sales tax is a
consumption tax under which all tax liability is remitted by retail businesses, while a value-added
tax is a consumption tax under which the tax liability is remitted by firms all along the importing,
producing and distributing chain. Although a VAT is generally not referred to as a withholding
tax arrangement for a retail sales tax, the relationship between the two taxes is very similar, and is
especially clear in an invoice-credit method VAT, where each business purchaser can credit against
its own tax liability the tax remitted on the transaction by the seller.
Information is central to the operation of non-capricious tax systems that are based on observ-
able, verifiable quantities. In self-assessment systems, much information is provided to the tax
authority by the taxpayer, subject to verification by the former, which can be obtained via au-
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dit, or third-party information reports. Third-party information reporting refers to a mandatory
requirement on certain third parties (e.g., businesses, financial institutions, and non-tax-related
government agencies) to report payments (and other tax-related transactions) and payee details
(generally with a taxpayer identifying number) to the tax authority. This information can then be
compared against tax actually remitted, allowing suspect returns to be identified and for enforce-
ment actions to follow. Successful evasion now requires coordination between the party providing
the information report and the party responsible for remittance, but—and here is the key—their
incentives and willingness to falsify the data are unlikely to be the same (incentives can even work
in opposite directions). Thus, a working system of information reporting discourages noncompli-
ance by increasing the risk of detection for a given amount of tax authority resources. In practice,
for such arrangements to be su"ciently e"cient to make them attractive to revenue bodies there
must be electronic reporting by third parties of information reports and the use of a high-integrity
taxpayer identifier to facilitate the matching of information reports with tax authority records.
The central role of information reporting is reinforced by IRS data that shows that components
of taxable income for which information reports are nonexistent or of limited value, such as other
non-wage income and tax credits, have relatively high estimated misreporting rates. IRS (2012)
reports that the net misreporting rate is 56, 11, and 8 percent for income types subject to “little
or no,” “some,” and “substantial” information reporting, respectively, and is just 1 percent for
those amounts subject to both withholding and substantial information reporting. These relative
magnitudes are strikingly consistent with the deterrence model.
4.2 Market Transactions
Basing tax liability on market transactions—those between a willing buyer and an unconnected
willing seller—has several advantages. First, in a market transaction information can potentially
be obtained from either party, which provides a natural check on its accuracy. A second property is
that market transactions tend to be better documented, and the more documented a transaction,
the lower is the cost of gathering information on it. Finally, market transactions between unre-
lated parties establish arm’s-length prices, the availability of which greatly facilitates valuing the
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transaction. VAT, for example, relies almost entirely on market transactions, while taxing capital
gains on a realization basis rather than the theoretically-preferable accrual basis takes advantage
of the measurement advantage of market transactions. In contrast, estate and wealth taxation
cannot in general take advantage of market transactions to reliably value wealth.
Not all market transactions facilitate monitoring of the tax base, with market transactions carried
out in cash being particularly di"cult for a tax authority to monitor. Morse et al. (2009) document
that many evading cash businesses construct a parallel cash economy in which they collect cash
revenue, pay some expenses in cash, and then use the unreported cash they receive for cash
purposes. A cash business might also pay for inventory and other expenses in cash, and not
report the expenditure, thus reducing any suspicious discrepancy between revenues and costs (that
should be nearly proportional to sales). One problem that arises for cash businesses is that cash
transactions are susceptible to employee whistle-blowing, which Morse et al. (2009) suggest can be
addressed by hiring family members. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2011) o!er a stylized model of family
firms in which the benefit of a trusted employee is balanced against the cost of hiring an otherwise
ill-suited employee.
4.3 Public Disclosure
Another information-based tax-system instrument is public disclosure of tax details. As discussed
in Lenter et al. (2003), supporters of public disclosure cite the gains to the transparency of tax
policy, but also note that it may contribute to tax compliance because egregiously low income
declarations might elicit private information that contradicts a non-compliant taxpayer’s claim;
thus, it is a way for the tax authority to collect relevant information.
The small empirical literature on the e!ects of public disclosure has so far provided mixed evidence
about its e!ect on tax compliance. Hasegawa et al. (In Press) examine the Japanese disclosure
system, which ended in tax year 2004, and required disclosure of corporate and individual taxable
income only over a threshold amount. They find evidence that many corporations and individuals
manipulated their reported income to be below the disclosure threshold, but do not find evidence
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supporting an overall positive e!ect on compliance for either tax.
Slemrod et al. (2012) study the Norwegian disclosure system, making use of the fact that from
2001 the Norwegian tax data were made available on the Internet, whereas prior to that date they
were easily available only in a select number of communities. They find a small average increase
in reported business incomes after 2001 in communities that previously had limited disclosure,
consistent with public disclosure deterring tax evasion.
5 Tax Base Elasticity
5.1 Elasticity of Taxable Income
Because it holds the promise of summarizing the welfare cost of all behavioral responses—real,
avoidance, and evasion—undertaken to reduce tax liability, the elasticity of taxable income (ETI)
has assumed a central role in measuring the marginal excess burden of income taxation (Feldstein
1999, Usher 1986). More generally, the argument for considering all behavioral responses applies
to any tax base, not just personal income. The larger is the elasticity of response, the higher is
the marginal excess burden per dollar raised. In most standard models, hours of work is the only
dimension of behavioral response to changes in marginal tax rates, but the ETI concept generalizes
the set of behavioral responses to all the margins of adjustment a!ecting taxable income. In
addition to hours of work, higher marginal tax rates may a!ect taxpayer’s choices over intensity of
work, quantity of income-tax-deductible consumption (e.g., charitable giving), career choice, form
and timing of compensation, tax avoidance, and tax evasion (Saez et al., 2012).
These behavioral responses matter because, provided the private and social costs of sheltering one
dollar of income from taxation are equal, the ETI is a su"cient statistic for welfare analysis. At
the margin, a taxpayer will incur cost equal to one dollar, or sacrifice utility valued at one dollar,
to save one dollar in taxes. Taxpayers adjust all means available to reduce taxes by one dollar up
to the point that the marginal cost of doing so rises to one dollar. The anatomy of behavioral
response does not, in principle, matter because at an optimum for the taxpayer the marginal cost
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of saving a dollar in taxes is equal across all margins of behavioral response.
Empirically identifying the ETI boils down to estimating what taxpayers’ taxable income would
have been absent any change in marginal tax rates. Most recent empirical work has been based
on sophisticated di!erence-in-di!erence (DD) methods, which rely on identifying some “control”
group to measure the change in taxable income that would have occurred to the “treatment” group
absent the tax reform. Unlike experimental studies, treatment and control groups are not randomly
chosen, but are selected into by taxpayers according to income. This makes estimates biased if
there is any systematic variation across the treatment and control groups—due, for example, to
changes in inequality, real economic growth, and business-cycle dynamics—that is correlated with,
but not caused by, the tax reform under investigation. Panel data, that allow some sources of
non-tax related variation in incomes to be controlled for, can be potentially informative. These
issues are discussed at much greater length in Saez et al. (2012). Based on a comprehensive reading
of the empirical literature, Saez et al. (2012) suggest that the longer-term ETI lies between 0.12
and 0.40.
5.2 Issues in Applying the Elasticity of Taxable Income
Despite the attraction of the ETI as a su"cient statistic—in principle eliminating the need to
identify the anatomy of behavioral response—the overwhelming evidence of fiscal externalities
evident in the empirical ETI literature highlights the need to carefully adjust raw ETI estimates
to arrive at an accurate measure of marginal welfare cost. Two main issues come up in applying
an estimated ETI to welfare analysis: i) fiscal externalities and income shifting, and ii) changes in
the definition of the tax base. Fiscal externalities arise if a change in marginal income tax rates
induces taxpayers to shift income to another tax base, be it, for example, from the individual to the
corporate income tax base, or to any base at a di!erent date. When fiscal externalities arise, the
ETI overstates e"ciency cost because the observed reduction in taxable income is, to some extent,
o!set by socially valued revenue that is not accounted for. Hence, when constructing an ETI
suitable for welfare analysis, it is necessary to determine for each tax change under consideration
the extent to which revenue reductions in the applicable base lead to increased revenue elsewhere,
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and to know the relevant tax rate applying to that income.
There are several prominent cases of income shifting across tax bases. For example, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top-bracket marginal personal income tax rate to below the
corporate income tax rate, increasing the attractiveness of partnerships and S-corporations, for
which distributions are taxed as personal income, compared to C-corporations where income is
first subject to the corporate tax rate. Thus, revenue shifted into the personal tax base from the
corporate tax base. Similarly, anticipated increases in top-bracket marginal income tax rates for
1993 led some taxpayers to re-time income realization to the 1992 tax year (Feldstein and Feenberg,
1996). The ability of many high-income earners to re-time income suggests fiscal externalities
across time periods are likely to be larger for temporary than permanent tax changes (Goolsbee,
2000). But, on the other hand, adjustment frictions and longer-run considerations, such as bequest
planning, point to potentially larger fiscal externalities for permanent tax changes. A complete
accounting of fiscal externalities would also take general equilibrium e!ects into account. For
example, lower marginal income tax rates may increase labor supply and raise the pre-tax return
on complementary factors, such as capital, that are taxed via other bases.
Some changes in the definition of the tax base also a!ect the magnitude of the ETI, and its
policy implications. A narrow tax base is likely to have a higher ETI than a broad base with few
exemptions because avoidance schemes are facilitated by loopholes in the tax code. Because the
ETI is a function of the breadth of the tax base, it is not an immutable structural parameter,
instead being partially under policymakers’ control. Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), whose model
we discuss in the next section, argue that there is an optimal ETI.
6 Standard Instruments With New Costs
Having laid out the building blocks of tax systems, we turn now to what a tax-systems perspective
implies about the appropriate design of tax policy. We take a fresh look at some standard optimal
tax questions, and also examine what insights can be gained from applying the standard optimal
tax analysis to non-standard aspects of tax systems.
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6.1 The Optimal Commodity Tax Base
In the classic optimal commodity tax problem, first laid out by Frank Ramsey in (1927), at an
optimum the marginal excess burden per dollar raised is equated across all taxed commodities.
Assuming perfectly elastic supply of commodities, we need know “only” the matrix of compensated
own and cross-price demand elasticities to determine the optimal set of relative commodity tax
rates. In the special case where all cross-price elasticities of demand are equal to zero, but not
generally, optimal commodity taxes follow an “inverse elasticity” rule, in which at an optimum the
least price-elastic commodities face the highest tax rates.
Crucially, in this model the tax base—which commodities can be taxed—is held fixed. However,
because collection costs—administrative and compliance costs—can vary substantially by com-
modity, the breadth of the commodity tax base is also an important real-world choice variable. In
general, a broad commodity tax base distorts purchasing decisions less than a narrow tax base, but
if breadth comes at the cost of additional collection cost, optimality requires trading o! reduced
excess burden from distorted consumption choice against higher collection cost.
Yitzhaki (1979) studies this problem in a model with a representative consumer and a set of
commodities arranged in increasing order of fixed administrative cost per dollar of consumer ex-
penditure, with untaxed items imposing no direct cost on the tax authority. The representative
consumer is assumed to have Cobb-Douglas preferences, which greatly simplifies the choice of tax
rates for each commodity, because the homotheticity and separability properties of these prefer-
ences together imply that excess burden is minimized with an equal tax rate on all taxed com-
modities. This highlights the trade-o! between the tax rate and tax base breadth and sidesteps
the question of the optimal pattern of taxes on the taxed commodities—it is always uniform at a
rate high enough to raise the fixed required revenue.
Formally, the tax authority’s problem is to jointly choose the uniform commodity tax rate and
the breadth of the tax base, defined as the sum of expenditure shares for the taxed commodities,
subject to a revenue constraint. This formalizes a ubiquitous tax policy issue—to what extent to
broaden the tax base and “use” the revenue raised thereby to lower tax rates or, in this model,
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to lower the tax rate. For the retail sales tax, the recurring issue is whether to include services
in the tax base; services are a growing fraction of consumer expenditures but are widely thought
to be more costly to collect per dollar raised. To be sure, there are other justifications—real and
imagined—for special treatment of some consumption goods, such as externalities or redistribution,
but this model captures the essence of the policy tradeo!.
A narrow tax base creates a relatively large excess burden but has low administrative cost, while a
broad tax base has small excess burden, but requires more resources to administer. At an optimum
the marginal e"ciency cost of funds must be equal whether it is raised from a broader tax base or
a higher commodity tax rate. To be sure, the assumption of smoothly increasing administrative
costs overlooks some important real-world practicalities. For example, it may in some settings
be less costly to tax all commodities than all but one, in which case administrative costs are
discontinuous, and the optimally taxed set of commodities no longer varies smoothly with revenue
required.4
Broadening the tax base is also a perennial issue in income taxation where, for example, eliminat-
ing the deduction for charitable contributions would allow a lower tax rate(s) without sacrificing
revenue. In a single-period framework, because the tax rate on all taxed goods is the same, the
Yitzhaki model can be equivalently interpreted in terms of the share of goods whose expenditure
is deductible from taxable income in a linear income tax. Permitting a large share of goods to
be deducted from taxable income is equivalent to a narrow commodity tax base. But putting it
this way highlights that it is not always true, as in the Yitzhaki model, that broadening the base
raises collection costs: a comprehensive income tax base may be less costly to collect than one
with exceptions.
6.2 The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency
How many resources should government devote to tax enforcement? Intuitively, not as much as
would be needed to eradicate evasion completely, just as it does not make sense to station a police
4The intuition gleaned from this model survives relaxing the assumption of Cobb-Douglas utility to the more
flexible constant-elasticity-of-substitution form, in which case Wilson (1989) finds that the higher is the elasticity
of substitution between taxed and untaxed commodities, the broader is the optimal tax base.
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o"cer at every street corner to eradicate street crime. One needs to distinguish economically
recoverable tax evasion just as one distinguishes economically recoverable oil reserves from total
oil on the planet.
Because one measure of output of a tax agency, extra tax revenue received through direct collection
e!orts as well as deterrence, is denominated in dollars and is in principle measurable, some people
have been tempted to assert a simple rule for the optimal extent of tax enforcement: maximize
net revenue. Indeed, IRS commissioners seeking a higher budget appropriation and public finance
textbooks of a certain vintage assert that increasing the audit budget for the IRS is appropriate
because it would raise net revenue, implicitly presuming that at an optimum marginal audit revenue
and the marginal cost of obtaining that revenue, say via additional audits, should be equated.
But, as Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) show, this apparently intuitive argument leads to a socially
excessive level of enforcement because it ignores the fact that real resources are being consumed
to implement what is simply a transfer of funds between households and the tax authority; thus,
the implied optimality condition compares (marginal) apples and oranges.
There is an excess burden arising from evasion because it involves paying taxes in the form of a
gamble rather than with certainty. The optimal audit probability is set such that the marginal so-
cial cost of conducting audits equals the marginal reduction in the representative taxpayer’s excess
burden. Equating marginal audit revenue and marginal administrative cost—as IRS commis-
sioners and certain textbooks suggest—always results in a socially excessive level of enforcement.
Intuitively, a revenue maximizer raises no net revenue on the margin but takes a full dollar from
taxpayers. Spending a dollar in administrative costs to take a dollar from taxpayers can never be
optimal.
6.3 Endogenous Elasticity
Because the elasticity of behavioral response with respect to a tax rate is a central concept in
modern tax analysis, it is important to note that behavioral elasticities with respect to tax rates
depend on other tax system parameters. To see this, first consider the standard model of optimal
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progressivity, where the social planner chooses a tax function to maximize social welfare assuming
the elasticity of taxable income, which in many models is equivalent to the elasticity of labor supply,
is a structural preference parameter. The change in focus from labor supply to taxable income is
important, because numerous non-rate tax-system aspects under the control of policymakers—such
as the breadth of the tax base, opportunities for sheltering, and enforcement e!ort—may a!ect
the tax rate elasticity.
Recall that one of the motivating examples for focusing on taxable income and its elasticity, rather
than on labor supply alone, is the idea that higher tax rates may reduce labor supply only slightly,
but may induce significant shifting into ine"cient untaxed fringe benefits, tax shelters, and so on.
But tax policy could also directly address these issues by paring tax-exempt activities, restricting
shelters, and so on, which could substantially reduce the ETI, which in turn might increase the
optimal level of progressivity.
To address this issue, Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) modify the standard problem by allowing the
social planner to control a tax system instrument that a!ects the elasticity of taxable income
with respect to a tax rate, albeit with a resource cost. They focus on an example in which the
social planner controls the elasticity of taxable income by choosing the set of commodities that
are tax-deductible, which in their one-period model is equivalent to choosing which commodities
are taxed. This set-up links up to the literature on the optimal breadth of a commodity tax base
discussed above.
In the model of Slemrod and Kopczuk, consumers have Cobb-Douglas utility over a continuum of
goods. The vector of tax system instruments consists of a linear tax rate on income, a demogrant,
and the set of goods subject to tax. Taxpayers are assumed to supply one unit of labor inelastically.
Strikingly, the compensated elasticity of taxable income in this model with respect to the net-of-
tax rate simplifies to equal exactly one minus the expenditure share of goods subject to tax: the
broader is the tax base, the lower is the elasticity. This makes intuitive sense because there are
fewer untaxed commodities toward which to substitute when the tax rate rises. As in Yitzhaki
(1979) and Wilson (1989), a broader tax base lowers the excess burden of taxation, but is assumed
to raise administrative costs. For any given size of the tax base, the commodities minimizing
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administrative cost are assumed to be included in the tax base, so that administrative cost is a
smoothly increasing function in the neighborhood of the optimum tax policy.
The first-order conditions for the demogrant and the tax rate define the optimal tax policy, holding
the breadth of the tax base fixed, as in the Mirrlees (1971) problem, where the base was implicitly
fixed to be all income. Solving for optimal policy at each value of tax base breadth produces an
upward-sloping “Mirrlees” curve in (X, b) space, where X is the amount of revenue raised from
distortionary income taxes, and b is tax base breadth. Because the elasticity of taxable income in
this model is decreasing in the breadth of the tax base, ceteris paribus having a broader tax base
implies it is optimal to have a more progressive tax system, with the amount of revenue raised
from distortionary taxes serving as a su"cient statistic for progressivity.


























In contrast, taking the demogrant and revenue requirement as given and solving for the optimal tax
rate and tax base breadth, as in Yitzhaki (1979) and Wilson (1989), defines the optimal breadth
of the tax base holding progressivity constant. Solving for all values of the demogrant produces
an upward sloping “Yitzhaki-Wilson” curve in (X, b) space. This implies that more egalitarian
societies (raising more revenue from distortionary taxes) will have a broader tax base, and so a
lower compensated elasticity of taxable income.
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The globally optimal tax policy is found at the intersection of the “Mirrlees” and “Yitzhaki-Wilson”
curves, defining the optimal degree of progressivity and the optimal elasticity of the tax base.
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) prove that, in the neighborhood of an optimum, the “Yitzhaki-
Wilson” curve cuts the “Mirrlees” curve from below, so that an increase in egalitarianism (which
shifts up the Mirrlees curve) will increase the amount of revenue raised from distortionary taxes,
broaden the tax base and lower the compensated elasticity of taxable income at the optimum.
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) also prove that an increase in the cost of maintaining a broad tax
base—that is, an increase in marginal administrative costs holding the level of administrative costs
constant—decreases the optimal progressivity of the tax system and narrows the optimal tax base.
7 Bringing Firms into Optimal Tax Theory
7.1 Remittance
In the standard model, who or what entity must remit the tax triggered is unspecified, and
presumed irrelevant. Indeed, there is an invariance, or irrelevance, proposition emphasized in
most, if not all, public finance textbooks: it doesn’t matter which side of a taxed transaction must
remit tax (or which side has the statutory liability), the incidence is the same, and indeed all of
the consequences (other than what the pre- and post-tax prices are called) are the same. The
invariance theorem is a folk theorem, in that the assumptions are not made explicit. The theorem
suggests, for example, that it doesn’t matter if a retail business or a consumer remits a retail sales
tax: the outcome is exactly the same. It doesn’t matter whether only the retail businesses remit
based on their sales, as under a RST, or whether all businesses remit based on their value added,
as in a VAT. Current and historical practice suggest that the remittance structure does in fact
matter. Over 30 countries levy a value-added tax at a rate of 25 percent or above, and more than
70 countries levy a value-added tax at a rate of 15 percent or above (KPMG, 2012), and few levy
a retail sales tax at a rate over 10 percent; we can infer that these textbook-equivalent systems are
not practice-equivalent. The widespread existence of withholding and remittance at the source of
payment demonstrates the importance given to it by tax policy makers.
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Whenever the tax evasion or avoidance technology di!ers between potential remitters the textbook
irrelevance proposition no longer holds, and the assignment of statutory tax liability has real
consequences. Kopczuk et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence in support of this proposition
based on changes in the point of collection for state diesel taxes. They exploit variation across
states and through time in the proximity of the point of collection to final consumption for diesel
fuel. Collection at the retail level requires the tax authorities to monitor a large number of sellers,
whereas collection at the distributor level requires monitoring many fewer sellers, and collection
from distributors at the top of the supply chain requires monitoring an even smaller number of
sellers. Kopczuk et al. (2013) find that a re-assignment of remittance responsibility up the supply
chain—from retailers to distributors, distributors to wholesalers, or retailers to wholesalers—is
associated with a higher level of pass-through of the statutory tax burden to consumers, which
contradicts the textbook irrelevance proposition. They attribute their findings to evasion being
more costly the fewer are the number of remitters of the tax, which will be the case, for example,
if audit coverage is decreasing in the number of remitters, perhaps because there are fixed per-firm
costs of monitoring compliance. Under their assumption of perfect competition, a reduction in
tax evasion from a re-assignment of tax liability up the supply chain is passed through into higher
consumer prices.
7.2 Taxes and the Missing Middle
Firms below a certain size are often exempt from some taxes for administrative reasons, leading to
discontinuous tax treatment in firm size and few firms observed on the high-tax side of the cut-o!.
For example, in Japan small firms receive favorable VAT treatment, while in the U.S. corporations
averaging less than $5 million in gross receipts over the prior three years may use a cash rather
than accrual accounting method and are exempt from the corporate alternative minimum tax.
Although explicit or implicit exemption, or more generally special tax treatment, of small firms
might economize on collection costs (both compliance costs borne in the first instance by taxpayers
and administrative costs borne in the first instance by the tax authority), it also generally causes
production ine"ciency, in part because it provides a tax-related incentive for firms to be small.
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The tradeo! between the costs of collection and production ine"ciency has not been closely ad-
dressed by the optimal tax literature. In part, this is because nearly all modern tax theory has
been developed assuming that the party remitting taxes is economically irrelevant. In addition,
the seminal Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) theorem on aggregate production e"ciency posits that
production ine"ciencies, including from discriminating among firms in the same sector, should not
be tolerated if the government faces no constraints on its ability to levy optimal commodity taxes.
But their model of optimal taxation ignores administrative costs and assumes that there are no un-
taxed profits, due either to constant returns to scale—in which case firm size is indeterminate—or
a 100 percent profits tax.
An exception is Dharmapala et al. (2011), who develop a model in which fixed per-firm administra-
tive costs are responsible for the production ine"ciencies. With administrative costs, Dharmapala
et al. (2011) identify cases in which it is optimal to exempt small firms from taxation, creating
production ine"ciencies that are never part of an optimal tax system in the Diamond and Mirrlees
framework. These ine"ciencies occur because di!erent firms in the same industry sell output at
di!erent prices, and also because some firms obtain the tax exemption by reducing their outputs to
ine"ciently low levels, creating a “missing middle” of firm size. The central claim—that a missing
middle can potentially be generated by optimal tax policies—is theoretical in nature, rather than
empirical (that observed “missing middles” correspond to existing tax thresholds). However, there
is an emerging body of empirical evidence documenting cases in which the distribution of firm size
has been a!ected by various tax and regulatory thresholds. For instance, Onji (2009) analyzes the
introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) in Japan in 1989 that incorporated preferential treatment
for small firms, with a cuto! for eligibility of 500 million yen in sales, and finds a clustering of
firms just below this threshold following the reform.
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8 Lines and Notches
8.1 Tax Driven Product Innovation
As any tax lawyer will say, real-world, in-the-trenches, scu#ing about taxation is largely about
drawing and interpreting lines that separate the cases where discretely di!erent tax treatments
apply.5 Is a given charitable donation deductible or not? Are food expenditures a deductible
business expense for someone who sells their blood, or not? Is a worker an employee, for which
an employer must withhold and remit income and payroll taxes, or an independent contractor, for
which no withholding is required? Is a given hybrid corporate security debt or equity? In spite of
its ubiquity and policy relevance, line-drawing is almost completely absent from economic analysis.
Why?
Let’s begin with commodity taxation. The major reason for ignoring lines is that the modern
theory of optimal commodity taxation allows for a di!erent tax on each good. But it is excessively
costly to administer a separate tax on each good (or service), especially given that new goods
are being created every day. Actual commodity tax systems feature a very small set of rates and
each tax rate applies to a wide range of goods. Whenever selective commodity taxation is called
for, a non-capricious tax system must have procedures for distinguishing among goods subject to
di!erent tax rates. Real-world consumption tax systems do that by appealing to the characteristics
of the commodities. For example, the retail sales taxes of U.S. states often exempt food but not
restaurant meals, requiring the tax law to draw a line between the two categories. This is done
by appealing to a set of characteristics of a restaurant meal, and the line can be fine when, for
example, grocery stores sell pre-prepared meals that may or may not be eaten on the premises, or
set up in-store salad bars.
Some recent work (Kleven and Slemrod, 2011) addresses this set of issues by re-formulating op-
timal commodity tax theory in the language of characteristics, so that it matches up more easily
with real tax systems. To do so, they make use of Lancaster’s (1966, 1975) idea that it is the
characteristics of goods, not the goods themselves, which are the direct objects of utility, and
5See Weisbach (1999) for an insightful legal-analytical view of line drawing.
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there exists a mapping of each good into characteristics space. They formalize the relationship
between characteristics, substitutability and optimal tax rates, which allows one to explore the
notion that shared characteristics can be used to gauge substitutability and hence optimal tax
rate di!erentials. As expected, the closer two goods are in characteristics space, the smaller the
optimal tax rate di!erential.
With this reformulation, one can naturally address another important aspect of reality that has
been heretofore ignored by the literature on optimal taxation, tax-driven product innovation, the
creation of new products that requires no technical innovation, but which represent a re-packaging
of characteristics so as to reduce tax liability. On Wall Street or the City of London, tax-driven
product innovation is a major pre-occupation, where one objective is to design corporate finance
vehicles that qualify for the interest deduction accorded to debt finance, but have most or all of
the characteristics of an equity security. Sallee and Slemrod (2012) show that in response to the
U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax, car manufacturers tended to produce cars with fuel e"ciency just high
enough to reduce the “notched” (defined below) tax liability. Our favorite examples, discussed by
Harberger (1995), concern the response to high tax rates and tari!s on automobiles. In Indonesia
the preferential tax treatment of motorcycles led to the creation of a new type of motorcycle with
three wheels and long benches at the back seating up to eight passengers. In Chile the market
responded to high taxes on cars, but not on panel trucks, by introducing a redesigned panel truck
that featured glass windows instead of wood panels and upholstered seats in the back.
8.2 Notches
Lines create notches. Perhaps the simplest type of notch is a discontinuity in tax liability as a
function of the size of the base. We need look no further than the U.S. federal income tax code for
an example of an—admittedly fairly trivial—quantity notch. People with taxable incomes between
$3,000 and $100,000 are permitted to calculate their tax liability via a tax table made up of brackets
in increments of $50, so tax liability is discontinuous—albeit only up to a maximum of $17—for
each $50 of taxable income earned. Tying eligibility for tax and transfer programs to incremental
changes in taxable incomes also creates notches in the income tax code. For example, the U.S.
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Saver’s Credit provides a 50 percent credit on deposits into retirement accounts for married filers
earning less than $30,000, but only a 20 percent credit for filers earning $30,001 or more. With
contributions eligible for a credit capped at $2,000, there is a notch of up to $600 at a taxable
income of $30,000.6
Abrupt changes in tax policy, often caused by the use of (usually annual) accounting periods, create
notches whenever tax liability is non-linear in taxable income, or tax policy changes are anticipated
before their introduction in the new year. For example, the yearly system of accounting used in
most income tax codes provides incentives for taxpayers to re-time income realization whenever
reporting in one period rather than another avoids incurring taxes at a higher rate. An example
of this sort of re-timing was the legislation in 1992 of a higher top marginal income tax rate from
1993, which led many Wall Street firms to accelerate bonus payments so that in aggregate about
two-thirds were paid as end-of-year bonuses, compared to the norm of two-thirds beginning-of-year
bonuses (see Parcell, 1995), and Goolsbee (2000) documents a large increase in the taxable exercise
of stock options in 1992.
When there are di!erences in tax systems across geographic borders, notches exist because an
incremental change in the location of economic activity leads to a jump in tax liability. Consumers
living close to borders purchase relatively little on the high-tax side of the border, while corpora-
tions choose their location taking geographic di!erences in tax rates a!ecting them into account.
In principle, jurisdictions could remove these notches by setting graduated tax rates based on
distance to the border. This would favor those living closest to the border, but so does a uniform
rate policy in a high-tax jurisdiction because those living nearest the low-tax neighboring region
face the smallest transportation costs. As one example, in the U.S. di!erences is state sales tax
rates create discontinuities at state borders.7
Regardless of the desirability of notches as part of an optimal tax system, they can provide an
excellent opportunity to identify behavioral elasticities. At a notch, marginal tax (or subsidy)
rates exceed 100 percent, inducing behavioral response even in the presence of frictions. But,
6Ramnath (2013) provides evidence of bunching in taxable income at notches created by the Saver’s Credit.
7Agrawal (2011) finds that, in order to reduce the extent of cross-border shopping, municipalities on the low-
state-tax side of a border choose local sales tax rates that eliminate more than half of the di!erence in state tax
rates.
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despite the strong bunching incentives created by notches, optimization frictions for some taxpayers
can still be large enough to meaningfully attenuate structural elasticity estimates. Exploiting
administrative data on income tax filings in Pakistan, which has a tax system featuring notches
between each income tax bracket (average tax rates are constant within each bracket), Kleven and
Waseem (2013) find that about 90 percent of wage earners and 50-80 percent of self-employed filers
reported incomes in strictly dominated regions. They go on to show that the mass of taxpayers in
the dominated region can be used to separately identify the structural (i.e., ignoring optimization
frictions) and the observed elasticity attenuated by optimization frictions. Roughly speaking, their
technique for estimating structural elasticities requires inflating the observed elasticity inferred
from a notch by the share of people in the dominated region, so in the case of wage earners in
Pakistan the structural elasticity is about 10 times larger than the observed elasticity. Despite
the observed elasticities being attenuated by optimization frictions, Kleven and Waseem (2013)
estimate small structural elasticities; the unusually large marginal tax rates at a notch induce
pronounced bunching behavior even with small structural elasticities for taxpayers not subject to
prohibitively large optimization frictions.
9 Conclusion
For the most part standard theoretical tools of public economics can be applied insightfully to
tax-systems issues, although future research should address some methodological weaknesses. The
failure to formally integrate concerns about horizontal equity in a satisfactory way is particularly
problematic for tax-systems issues such as evasion. Due to the practical importance of firms in tax
collection, tax-systems theory needs to move beyond constant returns to scale models of production
to models where heterogeneity of size naturally arises. Because the collection of information is
central to taxation, the Holy Grail would be to insightfully integrate the theory of information
into the theory of taxation.
As we seek the Holy Grail, our analysis must move beyond the either-or world of the first wave
of optimal tax theory, where some information is available to government perfectly and costlessly,
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while other information is impossible to obtain. The collection and verification of information is
very costly, often at least 10 percent of revenue collected and, even with these resources devoted
to collection, tax gaps are large in developed countries and even larger in developing countries. In
the real world of taxation much of the action is in between two extremes: information is observable
with error, to varying degrees, and its quality depends greatly on the type of administration and
enforcement in place.
Policy makers are well advised to recognize the interrelationship among tax rates, bases, enforce-
ment, and administration. There are many alternatives to raise revenue, and many types of costs,
some that show up in government budgets and some that do not, and the costs of using one tax
instrument often depends on the setting of others. Recognizing that tax policy is really tax-system
policy can ward o! substantial policy errors, such as foregoing tax rate increases because the exist-
ing (suboptimal) base is narrow, and misinterpreting large short-run responses to policy changes
as indicative of long-run behavioral response.
Frank Hahn (1973, p. 106) once commented that “Optimum tax formulas are either guides to
action or nothing at all.” The stylized treatment of information in the literature to this point has
a!orded tremendous insight into the consequences of taxation and its proper design. We believe
that an important next step in completing this task is to pursue the issues this paper addresses.
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